Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 63

Issue 1

Article 7

1974

Recent Developments in Duties of Owners and Occupiers of Land:
Wood v. Camp--Florida Imposes Upon Landowners a Standard of
Reasonable Care to "Licensees by Invitation"
David A. Koening
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Torts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Koening, David A. (1974) "Recent Developments in Duties of Owners and Occupiers of Land: Wood v.
Camp--Florida Imposes Upon Landowners a Standard of Reasonable Care to "Licensees by Invitation","
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 63: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol63/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

COMMENTS
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DUTIES OF
OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND: WOOD v.
CAMP - FLORIDA IMPOSES UPON LANDOWNERS
A STANDARD OF REASONABLE CARE TO
"LICENSEES BY INVITATION"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of defining a landowner's' duty to those entering upon his land has been the subject of continuing litigation and commentary. 2 Most American courts continue to
apply the common law formula which ascertains the landowner's duty by classifying an entrant as a trespasser,
licensee, or invitee.3 However, a growing number of courts,4
supported by the vast majority of commentators,5 have broken
with tradition and have rejected or greatly modified the common law entrant classification scheme. The growing minority
has chosen to impose upon owners and occupiers of land a
I For the purposes of this comment, the terms "landowner," "land occupier," and
"possessor of land" are used interchangeably to mean one who would be answerable
to an action in negligence brought by one injured on his premises.
2 See Hughes, Duties to Trespassers:A Comparative Survey and Reevaluation,
68 YALE L.J. 633 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hughes]; James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as James]; McDonald and Leigh, The Law of Occupiers' Liability
and the Need for Reform in Canada,16 U. ToRONTo L.J. 55 (1965); Marsh, The History
and ComparativeLaw of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers,69 L.Q. REv. 182 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Marsh]; Payne, The Occupiers' LiabilityAct, 21 MODERN L. REV.
359 (1958); Note, 17 MODERN L. REv. 265 (1964); 25 VXND. L. REv. 623 (1972).

3 For a discussion of these distinctions and the duties accompanying each, see
notes 18-28 infra.
Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Mile High Fence
Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971); Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu,
452 P.2d 445 (Hawaii, 1969); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973); Peterson
v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972).
See generally Hughes at 633; Long, Land Occupant'sLiability to Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 31 TENN. L. REV. 485 (1964); McCleary, The Liability of a
Possessorof Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. REv. 45
(1936); Comment, Occupier of Land Held to Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to All Entrants - "Invitee," "Licensee, " and "Trespasser" DistinctionsAbolished, 44 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 426 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV.].
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broad duty of reasonable care to entrants under all circumstances.
These two opposing philosophies converged in the recent
case of Wood v. Camp,' in which Florida joined those states
which have judicially examined and redefined the rights and
duties of landowners in this area of the law. Wood v.Camp7 was
a wrongful death action brought by the father of Randall
Camp, a minor, who died as a result of a gas explosion in a
bomb shelter at the home of Frank Wood. Randall Camp and
Frank Wood, Jr., had done some painting in the bomb shelter
and were working on an outboard motor in the Wood garage.
On the day of the explosion, Wood was not present, and reasons
are unclear why Camp ventured into the bomb shelter alone.
The trial judge, following well-established precedent,8
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Second
District Court of Appeals of Florida reversed;9 in abolishing in
toto the common law categories of invitee, licensee, and tresr
passer, the court imposed upon owners and occupiers of land a
single duty of reasonable care under all the circumstances as
to all .entrants.0 The defendants thereupon applied for a writ
of certiorari for review by the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court was unwilling to allow the
complete abrogation of the trespassee-licensee-invitee classifications in favor of a single standard of reasonable care." The
court felt the limited duty toward trespassers and others not
reasonably anticipated upon the land worthy of retention and
was concerned that a single standard of care would not "sufficiently afford a reasonable standard which can be applied as a
measure by the jury.' '1 2 The court also feared that the lack of
standards might practically make the landowner "an insurer of
those who enter upon his premises."' 3
6 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).

'Id.
See Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972), in which the standard of care
owed a social guest was stated as "[The landowner] must not wilfully and wantonly
injure a licensee, or intentionally expose him to danger . . . ." Id. at 147. See also
Goldberg v. Straus, 45 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1950); Hauben v. Melton, 267 So. 2d 16 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1972).
Camp v. Gulf Counties Gas Co., 265 So. 2d 730 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972).
, Id. at 731.
Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973).
,2Id. at 695.
, Id. at 696.
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Instead, the Florida Supreme Court expanded the class of
invitees-those to whom the landowner traditionally owes a
duty of reasonable care"4- to include "licensees by invitation"
(either express or reasonably implied) of the property owner. 5
The court then remanded the case for a determination of
whether Randall Camp was present in the bomb shelter at the
time of the explosion at the express or implied invitation of the
defendant.
II.

DUTIES

OF OWNERS

AND

OCCUPIERS:

THE HISTORICAL

CONTEXT

Negligence liability is predicated upon the breach of a
legal duty of care running from one person to another. The
classic formulation of the usual duty of care was announced in
the case of Heaven v. Pender:'6
Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a
position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary
sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not
use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to
those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill to avoid such danger.'"
The requisite duty of care imposed upon a landowner, however,
traditionally has been determined by classifying the injured
party as a trespasser,' licensee,' 9 or invitee. 20 The underlying
" See Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 147-48 (Fla. 1972); McNulty v. Hurley, 97
So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341A (1965) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. See also note 20 infra.
,1 284 So. 2d at 695.
S11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883) (Brett, M.R.).
,7 Id. at 509. Master Brett, later Lord Esher, subsequently modified his conception
of duty in Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491. See also F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 27.1, at 1430 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
11 The state of the law concerning the duties of owners and occupiers of land
prompted one English judge to state:
What I particularly wish to emphasize is that there are three different
classes-invitees, licensees, trespassers ...
Now the line that separates each of these three classes is an absolutely
rigid line. There is no halfway house, no no-man's land between adjacent
territories. When I say rigid, I mean rigid in law. ...
Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries) v. Dumbreck, (1929) A.C. 358, 371 (Scot.) (Dunedin,
V.).
"A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of

182
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another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 329. See Mann v. Des Moines Ry., 7 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Iowa
1942).
"The owner owes a trespasser no duty other than not to intentionally harm him.
No group of ideas has been harder set in the pronouncements of courts." Green, The
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 271 (1929). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 333. See generally HARPER & JAMES, supra note 17, at § 27.1; W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 58 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Hughes
at 633; Marsh, supra note 2. See also note 26 infra.
19 "A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by
virtue of the possessor's consent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 330. "Such a person is not
a trespasser, since he is permitted to enter; but he comes for his own purposes rather
than for any purpose or interest of the possessor of land. He has only the consent to
distinguish him from a trespasser... ." PROSSER § 60 at 376. See Post v. Lunney, 261
So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 1972).
Generally, " . . . the licensee must take the land as he finds it. 'Of course, the
landowner is liable if he does him intentional injury, or wantonly or recklessly exposes
him to danger ..
' " O'Brien v. Union Freight R.R., 95 N.E. 861, 862 (Mass. 1911)
(emphasis added). Thus the law protects licensees against "reckless" as well as willful
conduct, while a trespasser is protected only against the latter. See Gonzalez v. Broussard, 274 S.W.2d 737, 738-39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). The landowner is, however, under
no duty to inspect the premises to discover dangers or warn the licensee of dangers
which are reasonably discoverable by the licensee. Myszkiewitz v. Lord Baltimore
Filling Stations, Inc., 178 A. 856, 857-58 (Md. 1935); State v. Tennison, 486 S.W.2d
219, 221-22 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
A classic, albeit grossly oversimplified, statement of a licensee's rights can be
found in Reardon v. Thompson, 21 N.E. 369 (Mass. 1889): "No doubt a bare licensee
has some rights. The landowner cannot shoot him." Id. at 370. See generally PROSSER
§ 60; James, supra note 2; Marsh, supra note 2. See also note 27 infra.
" At its inception, the invitee category was composed solely of "business visitors."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 332 (1934). A "business visitor" is defined as "a person who
is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them." Id.
Bennett v. Railroad Co., 102 U.S. 577 (1880), seemed to establish the necessity of an
economic benefit for invitees. The source of this mutual advantage test is attributed
to R. CAMPBELL, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 63-64 (2d ed. 1878) by Prosser in Prosser, Business
Visitors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REv. 573, 583 (1942).
The standard of care as to invitees is that a possessor of land is subject to
liability to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by his failure to
carry on his activities with reasonable care for their safety, if but only if, he
should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to
protect themselves against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 341A.
The elevated status of invitees can be seen in that "[T]he occupier is commonly
said to owe greater duties to his invitees than to licensees, notably with respect to
inspection and discovery of latent dangers on his land." HARPER & JAMES, supra note
17, § 27.12, at 1478. For an incisive summary of the law as to invitees see Commentary,
Traditional Distinction between Trespassers, Licensees, and Invitees Abolished as
Determinativeof the Standard of Care Owed a Visitor, 25 ALA. L. REv. 401, 403 n.12
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Commentary, 25 ALA. L. REv.]. See also McDonald &
Leigh, supra note 2 at 56-63; PROSSER § 61; note 28 infra.
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philosophy of this entrant classification scheme explains, at
least in part, why the classifications have remained so resistant
to change. In a post-feudal society, such as Victorian England,
based upon and strongly supportive of private ownership, it
was considered a socially desirable policy to allow a person to
use his land as he saw fit, without the burden of protecting
those who entered without permission or with only the acquiescence of the owner.21 Moreover, as the Industrial Revolution reached its peak, more intensive and potentially dangerous
uses of land were being made to accommodate increasing urbanization and industrialization. Factories, mines, and tenements replaced once vacant land.2 2 In addition, the greater
concentrations of population provided increasing numbers of
potential victims of these industrial hazards.
When accidents did occur, embryonic concepts of negligence came into conflict with more extensively developed property concepts favoring the unfettered use of land. At this interface between negligence and property law, the latter predominated; and the financial burden of the injury was allowed to fall
upon the victim rather than upon the landowner, who was
protected because of his economic contributions to the economic vitality of society.2
Application of the tripartite entrant classifications often
led to harsh and inequitable results.2 4 Moreover, as time

" See PROSSER § 58, at 359. See also F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF ToRTs 16264 (1926); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 17, at § 27.1; Marsh, supra note 2.
Early cases applying these categories were Chapman v. Rothwell, 120 Eng. Rep.
471 (Q.B. 1858); Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866). The first American case
adopting the distinctions was Sweeny v. Old Colony & N.R.R., 92 Mass. (10 Allen)
368 (1865).
, See generally R. PALMER & J. COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 42229 (3d ed. 1965).
z See generally Green, supra note 18, at 271-72; Marsh, supra note 2, at 183-86.
A recent commentator has presented an excellent summary of the suggested reasons
for the classification system, none of which he has found compelling. See Commentary,
25 ALA. L. REv. at 407-08 n.28.
21 E.g., McAlpin v. Powell, 55 How. Pr. 163 (N.Y. 1878), in which a ten year old
was killed when he fell through a rusted trap door on the fire escape outside his
tenement window, but the landlord was held not liable; Dunbar v. Olivier, 50 P.2d 64
(Colo. 1935), in which recovery was denied a nine year old boy who became a permanent cripple when burned at an unattended bonfire in an open lot in violation of a
statute; Reardon v. Thompson, 21 N.E. 369 (Mass. 1889), in which recovery was denied
for injuries suffered when plaintiff, a lawful visitor, fell into an unilluminated excavation hole on a strip of land which was the only access to defendant's house.
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passed, the philosophy supporting the special status of owners
and occupiers of land changed, and the law became "more
willing than in the past to protect personal safety at the expense of property rights."" As a result of these developments,
further complications, exceptions, and subcategories were created within the classifications of trespasser, 2 licensee, 7 and
21

Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. at 427.

26 The duty toward known and "constant trespassers on a limited area,"

§ 334, was ameliorated so that a landowner was "subject to
liability for bodily harm there caused to them by his failure to carry on an activity
involving a risk of death or serious bodily harm with reasonable care for their safety."
Id. at § 334; Palmer v. Gordon, 53 N.E. 909 (Mass. 1899); Johnson v. Lake Superior
Terminal & Transfer Co., 56 N.W. 161, 163 (Wis. 1893). Moreover, the landowner is
subject to liability for bodily injury caused to known trespassers by dangerous artificial
conditions of which the owner is reasonably apprised but the trespasser is unlikely to
discover. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 335; Clark v. Longview Public Service Co., 255 P.
380 (Wash. 1927).
Child trespassers have traditionally received more protection. In Sioux City &
P.R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873) (the "turntable case") the Supreme
Court affirmed recovery by a child trespasser who was maimed by defendant's turntable. The "attractive nuisance" doctrine was a development of the "child trespasser"
exception. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 339; Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, 437
S.W.2d 484 (Ky. 1968); Lyshak v. City of Detroit, 88 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. 1958); Marsh,
supra note 2.
Ameliorating doctrines also developed within the licensee category. Instead of
liability for only wanton, willful or reckless conduct - see text accompanying note 18
supra - an owner or occupier may be held to a standard of reasonable care "if, but
only if, (a) he should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and (b)
they do not know or have reason to know of the possessor's activities and of the risk
involved." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 341. This may give rise to a duty to warn licensees
of dangerous conditions. Gonzalez v. Broussard, 274 S.W.2d 737, 738-39 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954); Arbogast v. Terminal R.R., 452 S.W.2d 81, 83-84 (Mo. 1970) (duty to warn
licensee of ultrahazardous substances which the licensee was unlikely to discover). A
possessor may also be held liable for leaving a "trap" on his premises because he
knowingly or recklessly let a licensee run into a hidden peril. Midwest Oil Co. v. Storey,
178 N.E.2d 468, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961). A trap once referred to a device or condition
created with intent to injure, but now "generally means any kind of a hidden dangerous
condition and there need not be any intent to injure." Walker v. Williams, 384 S.W.2d
447, 451 (Tenn. 1964).
In Gross v. Bloom, 411 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1967), a minor guest was injured when
she fell through a clothes chute located in the closet in which she had been playing.
The Court of Appeals reversed a directed verdict for the defendant. Although there was
evidence that the defendant knew that the children were playing in the closet, the
Court ignored RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 341. Instead, the Court applied the "attractive
nuisance" doctrine, Id. at § 339, reasoning that a child social visitor should have at
least the protection given a child trespasser. Gross, supra at 328. See also Kemline v.
Simonds, 41 Cal. Rptr. 653, 655 (Ct. App. 1965).
The distinction of "active" versus "passive" negligence has also developed."..
[Aictive negligence . . . is negligence occurring in connection with activities conRESTATEMENT (SECOND)

1975]

COMMENTS

invitee. 28 These complications were inevitable, according to
commentator Graham Hughes, "for the simplicity of the ninereflectteenth century approach was a simplicity of harshness,
2
ing a social law which could not long be tolerated. 1
Instead of imposing order and minimizing the inequity,
however, these efforts at mitigating harshness created a "complex patchwork of legal classifications [which were] by no
means uniformly interpreted by the various jurisdictions."3 °
Writing more pointedly, Hughes states:
...[Tihese efforts have only made the structure more hideous. They are like an attempt to convert a bicycle into an
automobile by adding parts. Each fresh distinction, each supducted on the premises while the licensee is present and his presence should be known
to the licensor." Arbogast v. Terminal R.R., 452 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Mo. 1970); Hansen v.
Richey, 46 Cal. Rptr. 909, 911-13 (Ct. App. 1965). See also Bylstone v. Kiesel, 431 P.2d
262, 263-64 (Ore. 1967); Perry v. St. Jean, 218 A.2d 484, 485-86 (R.I. 1966); Bradshaw
v. Minter, 143 S.E.2d 827, 829-30 (Va. 1965); Oettinger v. Steward, 148 P.2d 19, 21-22
(Cal. 1944). Oettinger has been effectively overruled by Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d
561 (Cal. 1968). See text accompanying notes 48-54 infra.
Perhaps the broadest statement of any of the ameliorating doctrines can be found
in Cunningham v. Hayes, 463 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971): "And once presence
becomes known, whether that of an invitee, licensee, or trespasser, the significance of
status largely disappears, and a uniform duty - that of reasonable care - is owed to
each as to activities conducted on the premises." Id. at 559. See also Ralls v. Caliendo,
422 P.2d 862, 866-68 (Kan. 1967) (Fatzer, J., dissenting in part); Hardin v. Harris, 507
S.W.2d 172, 175-76 (Ky. 1974); Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 126 A.2d 313
(N.J. 1956); Potts v. Amis, 384 P.2d 825 (Wash. 1963) (recovery allowed for social guest
struck by a golf club while his host was demonstrating his golf swing).
The duty toward invitees has remained constant-that duty being one of ordinary care under all the circumstances. See note 20 supra. What has changed is the
types of persons to whom this duty is owed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 332 added
"public invitee" to the "business visitor" of the first RESTATEMENT, supra note 14 at
§ 332. A "public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for which the land is held open to the public." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) § 332. With respect to the sort of "invitation" the public invitee must
receive, Fleming James has written:
The invitation test does not deny that "invitation" may be based on
economic benefit, but it does not regard it as essential. Rather, it bases
"invitation" on the fact that the occupier by his arrangement of the premises
or other conduct has led the entrant to believe "that [the premises] were
intended to be used by visitors" for the purpose which this entrant was
pursuing, and that such use was not only acquiesced in by the owner...
but that it was in accordance with the intention and design with which the
way or place was adopted and prepared.
James, supra note 2, at 613. See also Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 1972).
Hughes at 686.
Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 427.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63

plementary doctrine, comes no doubt, from a well-meaning
design to nuzzle closer to the real problems which clamor for
scrutiny in these cases, but often it will have the paradoxical
effect of smothering the issues and making their appraisal
3
impossible. '

In addition to excoriating the increasing complexity of the
entrant classification schemes, vigorous criticism has also been
32
focused on the system's shabby treatment of the social guest.
There is an apparent contradiction in that, as Prosser notes
a social guest, however cordially he may have been invited and urged to come, is not in law an invitee - a distinction which has puzzled generations of law students, and even
some lawyers. The guest is legally no more than a licensee,
to whom the possessor owes no duty. . . of affirmative care
to make the premises safe for his visit.3
" Hughes at 695. TWo contemporaneous California cases provide an excellent
example of the confusion engendered by the classifications. In Braun v. Vallade, 164
P. 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1917), and Kneiser v. Belasco-Blackwood Co., 133 P. 989 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1913), plaintiffs suffered injuries resulting from defective conditions in saloons. In Kneiser plaintiff was denied recovery because his friends had bought his
drinks. In Braun plaintiff was allowed recovery because he had purchased a drink,
although his original purpose in entering the saloon was to use the restroom.
-1 Since the English case of Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856),
social guests have been classified as licensees, entitling them to those limited protections afforded licensees. One judge has remarked that
[slo far as my research discloses, every commentator who has discussed this
question of the classification of social guests as mere licensees for purposes
of determining the level of care owed such guests by the host and has expressed an opinion of his own has strongly criticized the rule.
Sideman v. Guttman, 330 N.Y.S.2d 263, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1972). See Harper, Laube v.
Stevenson; A Discussion, 25 CONN. BAR J. 123 (1951); Long, Land Occupant'sLiability
to Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 31 TENN. L. REv. 485 (1964); McCleary, The
Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land, 1
Mo. L. REv. 45 (1936); Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, 26 MNN. L. REv. 573,
612 (1942). See also Note, Torts- Duty of Occupier to Social Guests, 19 LA. L. REv.
906 (1959); Comment, The Outmoded Distinction between Licensees and Invitees, 22
Mo. L. REV. 786 (1957); Comment, Negligence: Land Occupiers' Liability for Injuries
to Lawful Entrants- Trend Toward Reasonable Care in All Instances, 4 VmL. L. REv.
256 (1958); Comment, Status of the Social Guest: A New Look, 7 WM. & MARY L. Rev.
313 (1966); Comment, 18 KAN. L. REv. 161 (1969); Comment, 15 N.Y.L.F. 933, 940-41
(1969); Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 426 (1969); Comment, 9 SANTA CLARA LAw. 179
(1968); Comment, 14 S.D.L. REv. 332 (1969).
" PROSSER § 60, at 378-79. See Shannon v. Butler Homes, Inc., 428 P.2d 990, 994
(Ariz. 1967) (recovery denied minor guest who ran through glass door). Wolfson v.
Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955) sought to explain this apparent contradiction in
the status of a social guest:

19751

COMMENTS

According to Fleming James, 34 the justification for this
limited duty is that the
• . . limitation of duty probably conforms to people's reasonable expectations in the ordinary host-guest situation. If the
host is the kind of person who does not inspect and maintain
his property on his own account, a guest scarcely expects an
exception to be made on the occasion of his visit.
[Mioreover, while most social contact is among people who
are on a similar economic footing, the host is usually in no
better position than the guest to absorb or distribute the
lOSS.3 1

This rationale has always been questionable, and the converse
probably conforms more closely to present day expectations.
An invited guest should reasonably expect that his host will
inspect his premises for the presence of concealed dangers and
...The word 'invitation' here has been a source of difficulty because of an
apparent incongruity in terminology inasmuch as the 'invited' social guest
is held to be not an invitee but a licensee. We have here an invitee who is
not an invitee. The incongruity, only apparent, disappears, however, when
it is understood

. . .

there must be something more than the mere fact ot

an invitation to give the entrant upon another's property the status of an
invitee in the legal sense.
Id. at 450. What Wolfson suggests is that invitee status demands a mutual economic
benefit; see notes 20 and 25 supra.Invitee status could not be conferred by purely social
intercourse. Problems arose when social and economic purposes united. E.g., West v.
Tan, 322 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1963) (restaurant customer injured while descending bandstand, where she had been given permission to play piano, and lost her invitee status);
Hanson v. Cohen, 276 P.2d 391 (Ore. 1954) (parking lot customer lost his invitee status
after entering into dice game with attendant).
Is James, supra note 2.
Id. at 611-12. See also Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856);
PRossER § 60, at 379.
James' reference to economic and loss allocation considerations suggests a principle often articulated by commentators but only intimated by courts-that the availability of insurance may (and probably has) modified the underlying philosophy of
duties to social guests and other entrants. James, supra note 2, at 612, acknowledges
that "[ijf such insurance becomes prevalent, it may in time alter the matter of duty."
Hughes, supra note 2, at 691 finds:
The burden of making the occupier pay for the inevitable horrors of life is
already mitigated by the already widespread incidence of insurance .... A
great number of private householders also carry such insurance. . . insurance is always available, and the premiums are not heavy. An increase in
the number of verdicts favoring [entrant] plaintiffs would accentuate only
a very slight inflation of insurance premiums.
See also Benedict v. Podwats, 271 A.2d 417, 418 n.1 (N.J. 1970) (dissent from per
curiam affirmance of decision which allowed invitee status for social guest who performed incidental household services).
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arrange his property so as to minimize the possibility of injury
to his guests. The New York Supreme Court examined this
5 writing:
issue in Sideman v. Guttman,"
[I]t seems clear . . . that present day social customs are

wholly inconsistent with the view that a guest who visits a
friend does so at his own risk, is subject to the doctrine of
caveat hospes and is remediless against injury resulting from
his host's lack of ordinary care while he is on the host's premises.

37

Despite such criticism and calls for reform,38 only three
states made significant changes in the common law classifica39
tion system prior to the recent spate of judicial reevaluation.
Connecticut elevated the social guest to the status of an invitee
by statute in 1963.11 The Ohio Supreme Court, as early as 1951,
3' 330 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1972) which involved a social guest in her daughter's
home. Plaintiff suffered injuries when she stepped on a throw rug which "flew away,"
causing her to fall. The court held that absent proof that defendant 1) knew the rug
created a dangerous condition, and 2) knew that plaintiff could not be expected to
discover the existence of the condition, recovery must be denied under the rule of
Higgens v. Mason, 174 N.E. 77 (N.Y. 1930). Sideman v. Guttman, 330 N.Y.S.2d 263,
265-66 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The court then proceeded to sharply criticize the Higgens
holding and urge the New York Court of Appeals to confer invitee status upon social
guests.
11 Sideman v. Guttman, 330 N.Y.S.2d 263, 272 (Sup. Ct. 1972). This is not to
imply that all courts have been infected with concern over the social guest's status as
a licensee. E.g., Standifer v. Pate, 282 So. 2d 261, 266 (Ala. 1973); Haag v. Stone, 193
S.E.2d 62, 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Casey v. Addison, 211 N.W.2d 410, 411 (Neb. 1973);
Hilker v. Knox, 197 S.E.2d 618, 620 (N.C. 1973); Olsen v. Robinson, 496 S.W.2d 462,
463 (Tenn. 1973).
See notes 2 and 32 supra.
3' Major changes in English and Commonwealth jurisdictions antedated change
in America. England, where the common law entrant classification categories originated, abolished them by statute. Occupiers' Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31 § 2 at
303 (1957) which provides in part:
(1) An occupier of premises owes the same duty, the "common duty
of care," to all his visitors, except in so far as he cares to and does extend,
restrict, modify or exclude his duty to his visitor or visitors by agreement or
otherwise.
(2) The common duty of care is a duty to take such care as in the
circumstances of the case is reasonable to see that the entrant will be reasonably safe in using the premises for the purposes for which he is invited or
permitted by the occupier to be there.
Australia abolished the distinctions of invitee and licensee and imposed "a duty of care
to those persons whom it could reasonably foresee might be injured by any failure on
its part to act reasonably in the circumstances ... ." Thompson v. Council of Bankstown, 87 COMMW. L.R. 619 (Austl. 1952).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-557a (1968) provides: "Standardof care owed social

1975]

COMMENTS

criticized the meager protection the classification system afforded social guests" and created, sui generis, the separate distinction of social guests.2 Finally, Louisiana, by judicial decision, included social guests in the class of invitees,43 reasoning
(somewhat artfully) that since a social guest is expressly ininvitee. The standard of care owed to a social invitee shall be the same as the standard
of care owed to a business invitee." See Kopjanski v. Festa, 273 A.2d 692 (Conn. 1970)
(interpreting statute).
" "If a social guest is to be classified in Ohio as a licensee and is, therefore,
entitled only to the protection of a licensee . . as such duties are defined by Ohio
decisions, then the duty owed to him would be very meager." Scheibel v. Lipton, 102
N.E.2d 453, 461 (Ohio 1951).
42 "A reasonable solution of the difficulty of forcing social guests into any one of
the three molds commonly recognized is solved by ceasing such effort and merely
considering . ..social guests as social guests." Id. at 462. The duties imposed as to
social guests were: 1) "to exercise ordinary care not to cause injury . . . by any act
• . .or by activity carried on by the host on the premises;" and 2) to warn the guest
of dangers which a host knows or should know to be dangerous, if the host has reason
to believe that the guest neither knows or will not discover the dangerous condition.
Id. at 463.
It is arguable whether Scheibel caused any great change. James, supra note 2, at
612 did not think so:
It is true that a recent Ohio case [Scheibell has broken with tradition and
refused to classify the social guest as a mere licensee. . . .[but] [wihen
it comes to define the duties owed to this new class, however, the court
describes precisely those which most states prescribe in favor of a licensee.
A recent case indicates that Ohio courts are giving Scheibel a broader interpretation. See Di Galdo v. Caponi, 247 N.E.2d 732 (Ohio 1969), which allowed recovery for
a minor guest who was playing in his host's auto which was parked in the driveway.
Plaintiff engaged the transmission and the car rolled down the driveway. In getting
out of the car, the child wedged his finger between the car and a concrete wall, resulting
in its partial amputation.
,1Crittenden v. Fidelity & Cas., 83 So. 2d 538, 540 (La. Ct. App., 2d Cir. 1955)
assumed sub silentio that a social guest is an invitee. The court in Alexander v. General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La. Ct. App., 1st Cir., 1957)
seized on Crittenden, supra, stating, "we see no reason why the duty of ordinary care
should not be owed to social guests who are expressly invited to the premises as well
as other invitees . . . albeit other American jurisdictions differ."-Alexander, supra at
734. See also Daire v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 143 So. 2d 389 (La. Ct.
App., 3rd Cir., 1962) (followed Alexander, supra). The Louisiana Supreme Court
adopted invitee status for social guests in Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d
636 (La. 1967).
Michigan, for a short period of time also classified social guests as invitees rather
than licensees. Genessee Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Payne, 148 N.W.2d 503
(Mich. Ct. App. 1967) aff'd by an equally divided court, 161 N.W.2d 17 (Mich. 1968).
Preston v. Sleziak, 175 N.W.2d 759, 765 (Mich. 1970), repositioned adult social guests
as licensees. But see Leveque v. Leveque, 199 N.W.2d 675 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (guest
became invitee by performing incidental services).
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vited upon the premises, he should be an invitee. 4"
In addition, the distinctions of licensee and invitee were
abolished in admiralty law by the United States Supreme
45
Court in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.
Therein, a unanimous Court placed a duty of reasonable care
under all circumstances upon shipowners as to entrants whose
presence is "for purposes not inimical to [the shipowner's]
legitimate interest."46 The Court contrasted the simplicity and
practicality of its newly adopted standard to the confusion engendered by the application of the common law distinctions.7
III.

Rowland

AND ITS PROGENY:

THE RECENT

JUDICIAL

REEVALUATION

In Rowland v.Christian8 California became the first state
to completely abolish the common law distinctions and impose
a single standard of ordinary care under all circumstances.
Decided in 1968, this case has become the touchstone for nearly
all contemporary discussions concerning the duties of owners'
and occupiers of land.
In Rowland the plaintiff was a social guest at the apartment of Ms. Christian, who had agreed to drive him to the San
Francisco Airport. While the plaintiff was using the bathroom
prior to his departure, the porcelain handle on a wash basin
U

"... [Plaintiff] was a social guest in her son['s] home. She had been invited

and therefore was an 'invitee.'" Foggin v. General Guar. Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 636, 640
(La. 1967). This statement may make up in common sense for what it lacks in legal
precedent. See also Daire v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 143 So. 2d 389, 392
(La. Ct. App. 1962).
4 358 U.S. 625 (1959). Kermarec involved an action by a crew member's visitor
who was on board under a pass issued by the shipowner. Plaintiff was injured on a
stairway when a canvas runner allegedly slipped. A guest of a seaman had traditionally been a licensee. Silverado S.S. Co. v. Prendergast, 31 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1929);
Metcalfe v. Cunard S.S. Co., 16 N.E. 701, 704 (Mass. 1888).
4'358 U.S. at 632.
4,For admiralty law at this late date to import such conceptual distinctions would be foreign to its traditions of simplicity and practicality. ...
The incorporation of such concepts appears particularly unwarranted when
it is remembered that they originate under a legal system in which status
depended almost entirely upon the nature of the individual's estate . . . a
legal system in that respect entirely alien to the law of the sea.
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1959). The
Court adopted much of Chief Judge Clark's dissent from the Second Circuit's decision.
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 245 F.2d 175, 179-83 (2d Cir. 1957).
'1 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (2 judges dissenting).
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faucet shattered in his hand, severing tendons and nerves. He
brought suit and the trial court granted summary judgment for
Ms. Christian. The First District Court affirmed,49 holding that
Ms. Christian owed no duty to warn Rowland, who was a social
guest (and therefore a licensee), of the concealed dangerous
condition.'"
The California Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment .5 Rather than attempting to determine Rowland's place in'the classification scheme of trespasser, licensee,
or invitee, the court acknowledged that these common law distinctions were originally based upon policy decisions which
had, in time, been incorporated into law. It then emphatically
rejected these underlying considerations, stating:
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection
by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the
law because he has come upon the land of another without
permission or with permission but without a business purpose. -Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct
depenling upon such matters, and to focus on the status of
the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee in order
to determine

. . .

whether the landowner has a duty of care,

is contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian
values. The common law rules obscure rather than illuminate
the proper considerations which should govern determination
52
of the question of duty.
The court went on to hold that the entrant's "status" his relation to the landowner-was only one of several factors
to be considered in determining whether the landowner exercised reasonable care in the management of his property.5 3
Rowland v. Christian, 63 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
Id. at 102-03. Under the rule of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 342, however, there is
a duty to warn of a known dangerous condition if the landowner should expect that
his licensee would not discover the danger, but California did not follow this rule. See
Saba v. Jacobs, 279 P.2d 826 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Fisher v. General Petroleum Corp.,
267 P.2d 841, 847 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
s' Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
"

52

Id. at 568.

Id. The court also relied, in part, on a longstanding provision of the California
Civil Code, which provides:
Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in
the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has
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Rowland v. Christian evoked overwhelming favorable
commentary5 4 and has served as a catalyst for a judicial reevaluation of the privilege status of owners and occupiers of land.
Since the date of that decision, Hawaii,5 5 Colorado," Minnesota,57 the District of Columbia, 8 Massachusetts, 59 and now
willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself...
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714 (West 1972). During its 96 year existence, this provision had

been construed as a reformulation of the common law and never as a statutory abrogation of landowner's immunities. See Buckley v. Chadwick, 288 P.2d 12, 17 (Cal. 1955);
rehearing denied, 289 P.2d 242 (Cal. 1955). Commentators are in agreement that this
sudden reinterpretation of § 1714 was secondary to the policy considerations expressed
in Rowland. See Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 432; 25 VAND. L. REv. 623, 631 (1972).
" 33 ALBANY L. REv. 230 (1968); 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 167 (1969); 18 DEPAULL. Rsv.
852 (1969); 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 675 (1969); 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 426 (1969); 3 U. SAN FRAN.
L. REv. 170 (1968); 21 S.C.L. REV. 291 (1969); 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 147 (1968); 14
VILLANOVA L. REV. 360 (1969);'26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 128 (1969); 71 W. VA. L. REv.
226 (1969). See also Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 508 (1970).
55 Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Hawaii 1969) (Plaintiff
fell through a hole in the floor of a darkened restroom that he had been given permission to use).
We believe the common law distinctions between classes of persons have no
logical relationship to the exercise of reasonable care for the safety of others.
We therefore hold that an occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable care
for the safety of all persons reasonably anticipated to be on the premises,
regardless of the legal status of the individual.
Id. at 446, followed in Gibo v. City & County of Honolulu, 459 P.2d 198 (Hawaii 1969).
51 Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971) (recovery allowed
for injuries suffered by policeman who stepped into an unmarked post hole on property
abutting alley in which he was conducting surveillance); followed in Smith v. Mill
Creek Court Inc., 457 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1972) (interpreting Colo. law); Hurst v.
Crowtero Boating Club Inc., 496 P.2d 1054 (Colo. 1972). But see Cook v. Demetrakas,
275 A.2d 919 (R.I. 1971) (policeman, as licensee, denied recovery for injuries suffered
when he fell over embankment on construction site while chasing suspect): "As a
licensee, the occupant owes a policeman only the limited duty of not knowingly letting
him run upon a hidden peril, or not willfully causing him harm." Id. at 922. Mile High
Fence Co. was favorably reviewed in Comment, Premises Liability: The Foreseeable
Emergence of the Community Standard,51 DENVER L.J. 145 (1972).
11Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972) (wrongful death action for
minor who died from inhalation of carbon monoxide fumes while spending the night
at the house of a friend): "An entrant's status as a licensee or invitee is no longer
controlling, but is one element, among many, to be considered in determining the
landowner's liability under ordinary standards of negligence." Id. at 647.
11 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973) (injuries received by building inspector who fell down greasy steps
on defendant's premises): "A landowner must act as a reasonable man in maintaining
his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances... ." Id.
at 99.
11Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973) (injuries suffered by policeman
who fell on accumulation of ice on defendant's premises after delivering criminal
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Florida" have judicially abolished some or all of the traditional
distinctions. In other jurisdictions, similar cases have produced
vigorous dissents exhorting their highest courts to follow this
trend."

IV.

Wood v. Camp: THE

FLORIDA RESPONSE

While Wood v. Camp 2 follows the trend established in
6 3 it carves a different and narrower path.
Rowland v. Christian,
The Rowland court was unable to identify any justification for
continued application of the common law classification system; the Florida Supreme Court, however, perceived a continuing justification for limiting a landowner's duty as to unanticipated entrants:
An owner cannot, however, be held liable for a negligent condition as to an undiscovered trespasser who chooses to come
upon his property without his knowledge. It is unreasonable
summons) "Therefore, we no longer follow the common law distinction between licensees and invitees and, instead, create a common duty of reasonable care which the
occupier owes to all lawful visitors." Id. at 51. Two justices dissented, arguing that the
issue of the abolition of the distinctions was not briefed, and the same result could have
been reached on narrower grounds. Id. at 53-57 (Quirico and Reardon, J.J., dissenting
in part).
,"Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
" See Sideman v. Guttman, 330 N.Y.S.2d.263 (Sup. Ct. 1972); see text accompanying notes 27 and 32 supra. See also Heald v. Cox, 480 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972).
Most courts have not taken the opportunity to reevaluate the landowner's privileged status. A few have done so and refused to join in the trend toward modification
or abolition of the common law categories. See Astleford v. Milner Enterprises, Inc.,
233 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1970): "After a careful consideration and study of this rule we
can envision many problems in its application and we do not think conditions have
changed to such an extent that we should adopt this rule at this time." Id. at 525;
Werth v. Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1972), preferred the old approach
of carving out exceptions to the general rule when necessary. Id. at 907. See also Robles
v. Severyn, 504 P.2d 1284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Buchholz v. Steitz, 463 S.W.2d 451
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Payne, The Occupiers' Liability Act, 21 MODERN L. REv. 359
(1958):
A legal system must, in the nature of things, create and impose its own
comparatively rigid categories on the phenomena which it seeks to control,
and the seemingly arbitrary operation of them in borderline cases is the price
one has to pay for some degree of legal certainty and for the exclusion of bias
in the judicial process.
Id. at 373.
62 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
13443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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to subject an owner to a "reasonable care" test against someone who isn't supposed to be there and about whom he does
not know."
Guided by this consideration, the Florida court retained the
trespasser classification and left within the licensee classification "uninvited [licensees] . . . who choose to come upon the
premises solely for their own convenience without invitation,
either expressed or reasonably implied from the circumstan65
ces.",
On the other hand, the Florida Supreme Court felt that
the presence of an invitation, either express or reasonably implied from the circumstances, should place upon the landowner
a higher duty of care as to the invited entrants." Therefore,
Wood repositioned social guests and other "licensees by invitation" in the invitee category. The court therein rejected the
broad sweep of Rowland v. Christianwith its imposition of a
single duty of reasonable care, reasoning that such a rule would
leave juries without guidelines 67 and "virtually make the owner
an insurer of those who come upon his premises." 8 Thus, Florida's approach suggests two pertinent questions for further judicial consideration: (1) Who is a "licensee by invitation"; and
(2) Is their approach preferable to-or any different from-the
other cases abrogating or modifying the common law distinctions?
The phrase "licensee by invitation, express or implied"
seems to be redundant, for the term "licensee" connotes a person who enters upon or uses another's premises either with the
express or implied permission of the owner, or by operation of
law.6 9 The Florida Supreme Court further limited the term,
however. Focusing on the status of a social guest who is invited
to an apartment, the court's opinion suggests that such a tenant's social guest may be a bare licensee as to the landlord
when the guest is in "common areas" of the apartment building.'" It would seem logical, however, that a landlord could
284 So. 2d at 693.
'5

Id. at 695.

Id. at 694.

67 Id. at 695.
'5

Id. at 696.

7

See 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(26) (1966).
Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, (Fla. 1973), citing Tomei v. Center 116 So. 2d
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reasonably foresee that his tenants would entertain guests and
that these guests would use the common areas as means of
ingress and egress. Within the context of the landlord-tenant
relationship one could reasonably imply an invitation to the
guests of tenants. Moreover, if a tenant and his guest were
simultaneously injured due to the landlord's lack of ordinary
care in maintaining the common areas, it would be unreasonable to allow recovery to the tenant while denying recovery to
his guest. Apparently Wood will require further interpretation
to ascertain the status of police and firemen,7' door-to-door
salesmen, 72 and others traditionally falling within the licensee
category.
Moreover, the Wood court suggested that broadening the
class of invitees to include social guests and other invited licensees was based on logic and reason.7 3 It refused to allow the
. . . complete abolition of distinctions as between persons
upon an owner's premises for liability connected with the
condition of those premises, in the manner those distinctions
are wiped away without difference or standard in Pickardv.
City & County of Honolulu, Rowland v. Christian,Peterson
v. Balach, and Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
251, 253 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959). That a social guest of a tenant is a licensee when in
hallways and other areas in common is by no means universally accepted. See Sargent
v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528 (N.H. 1973). This particular area may be in doubt after Wood,
supra, because the court suggested that it was an area requiring guidelines. Id. at 695.
The Court then, however, suggested that Tomei, supra, was overruled. Wood, supra
at 697.
1, The general rule is that police and firemen are licensees. See 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 63(110-11) (1966). Florida apparently follows this rule, at least with
respect to firemen. Romedy v. Johnston, 193 So. 2d 487, 490 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958). See
also Natasio v. Cinnarron, 295 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Mo. 1956) (fireman is licensee); Narad
v. School Dist. of Omaha, 215 N.W.2d 115 (Neb. 1974); Scheurer v. Trustees of Open
Bible Church, 192 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Ohio 1963); Cook v. Demetrakas, 275 A.2d 919, 922
(R.I. 1971) (policeman is licensee). But see Buron v. Midwest Industries Inc., 380
S.W.2d 96, 98 (Ky. 1961) (fireman treated as sui generis class). Other courts have
disagreed and have classified public servants as invitees. See Dini v. Naiditch, 170
N.E.2d 881 (Ill. 1960); Cameron v. Abatiell, 241 A.2d 310, 313 (Vt. 1968) (policeman
is invitee); and Sprong v. Seattle Stevedore Co., 466 P.2d 545, 548 (Wash. Ct. App.
1970) (fireman is invitee). The question Florida courts must eventually answer is
whether the requirements of public safety reasonably imply an invitation for police and
firemen to enter upon property.
72 See Prior v. White, 180 So. 347 (Fla. 1938); City of Osceola v. Blair, 2 N.W.2d
83 (Iowa 1942); Phillips v. Bush, 363 S.W.2d 401 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961); Dunster v.
Abbott [1953] 2 All E.R. 1572 (C.A.).
284 So. 2d at 696.
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Transatlantique. The result of those cases is practically to
make the owner an insurer of those who come upon his premises.74

While broadening the class of invitees is based upon logic and
reason, the court's refusal to allow abrogation of the entrant
classification scheme is based upon an erroneous reading of the
cases which it cites. The result of those cases does not make the
landowner an insurer of his premises, and the distinctions are

not wiped away without difference or standards. The court thus
misinterpreted those decisions it cites, those which nullify the
common law distinction and impose a duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances. Only California 5 and Colorado 6 impose a duty of reasonable care upon landowners as to trespassers. Although the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that they might apply such a standard to
trespassers,7 7 in the other jurisdictions this standard clearly is
to be applied only to non-trespassers.
In admiralty cases, the standard of reasonable care applies
only to persons "on board for purposes not inimical to [the
shipowner's] legitimate interests."" The standard of care established by Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu 79 pertains
to those persons "reasonably to be anticipated upon the premises."8 0 This formulation would probably exclude all trespassers
except those drawn by attractive features. Both Peterson v.
, Id. (citations omitted).
7 See Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 496 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Cal. 1972) (allowed
wrongful death action by decendants of college student trespasser electrocuted while
attempting to unscrew bulb from street lamp).
11"A person's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may, of course, in the light
of the facts giving rise to such status, have some bearing on the question of liability,
but it is only a factor-not conclusive." Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d
308, 314-15 (Colo. 1971).
7 See Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1973). One judge in that case
thought Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), applied to
all entrants. Cooper, supra, at 656 n.13 (Bazelon, C.J.-author of Smith, supra). Another judge stated the case should exclude trespassers from its holding. Cooper, supra,
at 657 (Leventhal, J.). A third felt the issue need not be joined as it was unnecessary
to the holding and not properly before the court. Id. at 659 (Sobeloff, J.). As Judge
Sobeloff correctly pointed out, the issue of liability to trespassers was not before the
court; therefore, any discussion would be speculative.
7' Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959).
7' 452 P.2d 445 (Hawaii 1969).
Id. at 486.
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Balach"'and Mounsey v. Ellard2 abolished the traditional distinctions governing licensees and invitees, but declined to
change the status of trespasser because
. . . there is significant difference in the legal status of one
who trespasses on another's land as opposed to one who is on
the land under some color of right - such as a licensee or
invitee. For this reason, among others, we do not believe they
should be placed in the same legal category.
With these considerations in mind, it is difficult to discern
a significant difference between abolishing the distinctions between the classes of non-trespassers and broadening the category of invitees to include "licensees by invitation." Arguably,
the only difference is that Wood v. Camp 4 leaves a residue of
"uninvited licensees" in the traditional category of licensee. 5
It seems certain that the retention of this small group in
the licensee category will have minimal impact on the duties
of owners and occupiers of land in Florida and that its effect
will be no different from those cases which have imposed a
standard of reasonable care as to all non-trespassers.
V.

REMAINING PROBLEM AREAS

As Wood v. Camp86 demonstrates, the greatest objection to
the abolition or modification of the common law distinctions
and the imposition of a duty of reasonable care is the fear that
the landowner virtually will become an insurer of his premises."7 The rationale is that more and more cases will get to the
R1

199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972).

297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973).
Id. at 51-52 n.7. Petersonactually reserved judgment, but intimated reluctance
to abolish the trespasser category: "Furthermore, the considerations governing a landowner's. . . liability to trespassers may be fundamentally different from his duty to
those whom he has expressly or by implication invited onto his property." 199 N.W.2d
at 642.
" 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
" Id.
at 695. The Wood court realized that "this very limited category seems to
overlap with the trespasser" and only suggested one example of a possible "uninvited
licensee", acknowledging that "[tihese are areas requiring guidelines." Id. at 695. See
text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
" 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
" Id. at 696. See also Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 569 (Cal. 1968) (Burke,
J., dissenting).
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jury, thereby increasing its role, 8 and that without workable
standards, juries will invariably render more verdicts for plaintiffs.89
A.

Increasing the Role of the Jury

The theory that more cases will reach the jury has merit.
In fact, one of the criticisms of the common law distinctions is
that they prevent meritorious claims from ever reaching the
jury:
The common law classifications often resolve the occupier's
liability as a matter of law, whether by summary judgment,
. . . by non-suit[,] or directed verdict. Where such cases do
reach the jury, it is often for consideration of the plaintiff's
status rather than for the more fundamental question of
whether defendant has acted carelessly. Thus the jury is deprived of the flexibility necessary to allow it to assess the
burden of liability on the facts of each case in accord with
community standards.
1 "The greater the discretion conferred on the court, the more uncertain the
outcome of a case will be, and therefore the higher will be the proportion of cases that
go to trial instead of being settled out of court. That is a doubtful gain ...... Payne,
supra note 2, at 374. Hughes, a strong advocate of a single duty of ordinary care, is
not enthralled by the jury system either: "An award of damages by a jury is admittedly
not the perfect instrument for adjusting a social imbalance. Jury awards are influenced
by the capricious application of sentiment, and they exhibit distressing fluctuations
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction." Hughes, supra note 2, at 691.
" Wood v. Camp 284 So. 2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1973); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d
561, 569 (Cal. 1968) (Burke, J., dissenting). But see Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43
(Mass. 1973):
Our holding in the instant case does not make landowners and occupiers
insurers of their property nor does it impose unreasonable maintenance burdens. The 'reasonable care in all the circumstances' standard will allow the
jury to determine what burdens of care are unreasonable in light of the
relative [circumstances] . ...
Id. at 53. See also Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 106 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
90 Comment, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 430. See also Hughes, supra note 2, at 693.
1, Harshness results because the essential task of judging a landowner's
conduct under prevailing community standards is removed from the province of the jury. . . . Mechanical legal decisions made by judges eliminate
jury scrutiny of the actual conduct of the visitor and the landowner.
Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The problem of allocating the costs and risks of human injury is far too
complex to be decided solely by the status of the entrant, especially where
the status question often prevents the jury from ever determining the funda-
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Those cases abrogating or modifying the common law distinctions have expressly acknowledged that more cases will and
should get to the jury."
B.

The Search for New Standards and Jury Instructions

In Wood v. Camp the Florida Supreme Cburt feared that
the abolition of the common law categories and imposition of
a standard of reasonable care under all the circumstances
would leave judges and juries without guidelines.9 2 This being
so, the court apparently feared that juries would follow their
3
natural sympathies and allow recovery regardless of fault.1
These fears, however, have no basis in fact.
First, the assumption that juries are plaintiff-oriented has
never been conclusively proven. One extensive study, the Chicago Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law School,94
compared the jury verdict with the verdict the judge would
have rendered in 1428 personal injury cases. According to this
study, juries were only slightly more plaintiff-oriented than the
judge, and the bias usually manifested itself in the amount of
damages awarded.15 The director of the jury project, Professor
Harry Kalven, Jr., concluded: "The very widely held view that
juries in personal injury cases are more plaintiff prone than
judges is thus shown to be a considerable oversimplification." 9
Moreover, those cases modifying or abolishing the common law classifications did not completely eradicate all guidelines which could assist judges and jury in determining a landowner's duty. For example, one source of standards can be
found in the existing law as to invitees. A duty of reasonable
care has always been imposed upon owners and occupiers as to
mental question whether the defendant has acted reasonably in light of all
the circumstances.
Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973).
12 284 So. 2d at 694.
11This fear was articulated in some of the other cases abolishing or modifying the
traditional distinctions. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 105-06
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Minn. 1972); Mounsey v.
Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 53 (Mass. 1973).
g, See Kalven, A Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law
School, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 368 (1957).

13Id. at 380.
16Id.
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their invitees.97 In order to recover, an invitee historically has
been required to prove that a duty existed 8 and was breached.99
Moreover, this standard has never been applied in such a way
as to make an owner or occupier an insurer of his premises.
According to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, "[t]he standard of care owed to business invitees is . . .one of 'due care
to keep the premises reasonably safe' for their use, but the
[landowner] is not an insurer of their safety." '
Another source of standards for determining a landowner's
liability can be found in those cases which have nullified the
common law distinctions. Anticipating criticism that a single
standard of ordinary care would leave juries in a vacuum, the
D.C. Circuit, in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant,Inc.,"' formulated some basic considerations for a jury determination of
liability:
Eliminating reliance on the common law classifications does
not leave the jury awash, without standards to guide its determination of reasonable conduct. The principles which are
now to be applied are those which have always governed personal negligence under our jurisprudence. The factors to be
weighed in the determination of the degree of care demanded
in a specific situation are "the likelihood that [the landowner's] conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousnegs of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the
interest which [the landowner] must sacrifice to avoid the
risk," and the jury should be so instructed.' 2
Other factors which have been proposed as pertinent to a deterSee notes 21 and 28 supra.
See Nevarez v. Thriftimart, Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. 50 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (child
plaintiff, attracted by grand opening of store, was run over in the street. Judgment was
reversed because defendant was not in possession of the street and therefore had no
duty toward plaintiff).
" See Jones v. Jarvis, 437 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1969) (invitee could not recover absent
evidence as to how banana peel, on which she slipped and fell, got on the floor and
how long it had been there).
'" Kelly v. Kroger Co., 484 F.2d 1362, 1363 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Gowdy v.
United States, 412 F.2d 525, 534 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969)
(interpreting Michigan law); Frantz v. Knights of Columbus, 205 N.W.2d 705, 707
(Iowa 1973); Demaree v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 508 P.2d 570, 574 (Mont. 1973); Dickson
v. J. Weingerten, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
"' 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
' Id. at 105-06.
'7
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mination of negligence are: the time, place, manner, and foreseeability of the visito'° (which were formerly considerations
relating to the status of the entrant); the moral blame attached
to the defendant's conduct; the cost and availability of insurance; and the policy of preventing future harm.' 4
The D.C. Circuit's reference to the application of ordinary
negligence principles to duties of owners and occupiers of land
suggests yet another source of applicable standards. If ordinary
negligence principles, rather than the status of the entrant, are
dispositive of a landowner's duty, then the landowner retains
the full range of traditional defenses to actions for negligence.
Thus, contributory negligence," 5 unforeseeability, "° and financial statfs, 07 among others, will defeat recovery in actions by
entrants in jurisdictions which have abolished the common law
classifications.
One case in particular merits attention. In Cooper v.
Goodwin'5 injuries were received by a social guest who fell
down a basement stairway after having opened what she believed to be the bathroom door. Both parties were of modest
"I This factor has been adopted by all the cases establishing a broader standard
of reasonable care. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968); Pickard v. City
and County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (Hawaii 1969); Mile High Fence Co. v.
Radovich, 489 P.2d 308, 314 (Colo. 1971); Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469
F.2d 97, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647,(Minn. 1972);
Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 695 (Fla. 1973); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 52
(Mass. 1973).
101Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968).
"0 "Likewise, such a person entering upon the land will be held to the same
standard of care, that of a reasonable man under the circumstances then existing."
Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Minn. 1972). In Krengel v. Midwest Automatic Photo, Inc., 203 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. 1973), the plaintiff tripped over the slightly
raised floor of a photo booth. The court found the plaintiff contributorily negligent,
denying recovery. Although the case had originated before Peterson,supra, the court
in Krengel stated that the result would have been the same under Peterson. See also
Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 106 n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Martin
v. Barclay Distributing Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819-21 (Ct. App. 1970).
"0 "One is bound to anticipate and provide against what usually happens,
and what is likely to happen; but it would impose too heavy a responsibility
to hold him bound in like manner to guard against what is unusual and
unlikely to happen, or what. . . is only remotely and slightly probable."
Kaffel v. Cloverleaf Kennel Club, 504 P.2d 374, 375-76 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972), citing
Carr v. Mile High Kennel Club 242 P.2d 238, 240 (Colo. 1952), citing Stone v. Boston
& A.R. Co., 51 N.E. 1, 3 (Mass. 1898) (plaintiff was injured when a beer keg inexplicably fell off a stationary flat bed truck).
17 See Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
io Id.
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means, and the case provided the D.C. Circuit its first opportunity to apply the standards announced in Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant,Inc.' 9 The court stated that
. . . the financial capacity of the occupant to undertake
safety precautions should be taken into account in determining what was, for him, reasonable maintenance conduct. Financial hardship should be no excuse for failing to take those
measures which are within a defendant's capacity - for example, an adequate warning."'
This statement demonstrates the considerable flexibility
of a broader standard of reasonable care; this increased flexibility is the most cogent argument supporting abrogation or modification of the more rigid common law classification system.
For example, although a person may be financially incapable
of maintaining his premises, as in Cooper v. Goodwin,"' he can
always warn his guest of danger. Moreover, allowing a dangerous condition to exist on grazing land in a sparsely settled rural
area is vastly different from allowing a dangerous condition to
exist in a densely populated neighborhood with small adjoining
yards hnd wandering children. Although these situations defy
application of a precisely predetermined judicial formula, the
common law classification system insists on precisely such a
rigid, unvarying application. Furthermore, the common law
distinctions focus on the "status" of the injured party and do
not allow for consideration of the foreseeability of the injury,
the defendant's culpability, and other factors which may be
more relevant under the circumstances of a particular case.
C. The Quantitative Impact of Abolishing or Modifying the
Common Law Distinctions
Whether the abolition or modification of the common law
categories will actually result in more litigation and verdicts for
plaintiffs, as the court in Wood v. Camp feared, is a question
,1"469 F.2d 97- (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
110Cooper v. Goodwin, 478 F.2d 653, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Judgment for the
defendant was reversed in this case, but only because the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury that plaintiff could only recover for active negligence. This instruction was in direct contradiction of the standard formulated in Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" 478 F.2d at 653 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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which will be resolved in time. Although it is too early to perceive a definite trend, the most recent commentary states: "In
jurisdictions that have adopted the new rule, the types of plaintiffs who were recovering under the old scheme are still winning, and the types of plaintiffs (except the social guest) who
were losing before are still losing."' 1 2 It should also be noted
that all but two of the very cases which established the new rule
for their respective jurisdictions would have been similarly de3
cided by an application of the old scheme."
Moreover, the civil law experience of France demonstrates
that a duty of reasonable care under all the circumstances need
not result in a disproportionate number of judgments against
owners and occupiers of land."' French law never developed
status classifications such as trespasser, licensee, or invitee.
Instead, the nature of the plaintiff's entry on the premises is
merely one factor in the primary consideration of the plaintiffs
own fault in causing the injury to himself. Furthermore, the
burden is on the defendant to prove that he did not act unreasonably. In spite of the advantages that French plaintiffs enjoy,
Graham Hughes, after studying French case law, concluded
that "[t]he French experience is a demonstration of the practicality of a general theory of liability in this field, and at the
same time shows that such a general theory need not lead to
15
incessant verdicts in favor the plaintiff.""N
VI.

CONCLUSION

Because the common law categories of trespasser, licensee,
112

Commentary, 25 ALA. L. REv. 401, 412-13. (Footnotes omitted).

"3 Rowland v. Christian, 443 F.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (broken water faucet handle);

Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971) (unmarked construction
hole near alley); Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(grease covered stairs); and Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1973) (icecovered sidewalk caused by broken drain pipe). Each of these cases dealt with dangerous conditions of which the landowner was aware and which the entrant (all licensees
in these cases) could not have been expected to discover. Under these circumstances,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 341 imposes a duty of reasonable care upon the landowner.
The unlighted restroom with the unguarded hole in the center of the floor in Pickard
v. City and County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Hawaii 1969) is an example of a
concealed trap. See note 27 supra. Nevertheless, the results in Wood v. Camp, 284 So.
2d 691 (Fla. 1973) and Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972), would be
difficult to justify under the old system.
,' See Hughes, supra note 2, at 672-84.
,,5 Id. at 684.
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and invitee are based on policy judgments which have evolved
into law, their viability must be judged by the fundamental
assumptions which support them. If the necessity of protecting
the unfettered use and enjoyment of lai~d has been displaced
by an increasing concern for human safety, a continuing application of the common law distinctions does not serve the needs
of society. To prevent legal paralysis, a periodic reevaluation
of the competing interests in light of present realities is necessary.
Wood v. Camp"6 is the product of such a reconsideration
of competing interests in the area of the duties of owners and
occupiers of land:
[W]e are mindful of the basic reasons for the distinctions in
the first place; namely, that a property owner is entitled to
some privacy upon his own premises and should not be bound
to those who choose to avail themselves of it at will. We are
also cognizant however of the continuing inroads of a crowded
society, living of necessity in close proximity. We are aware
of the contiguous property of others which demands concern
for the welfare of our neighbor. Life in these United States is
no longer as simple as in the frontier days of broad expanses
and sparsely settled lands . . . . With social change must
come change in the law, for. . . " [t]he first duty of the law
is to keep sound the society it serves.""' 7
Wood is the most hesitant and limited of the recent cases
abolishing some or all of the common law categories in favor
of a broader standard of reasonable care. Though striking a
balance in favor of "invited" entrants, it stops short of the
advances made in other jurisdictions which either have increased the landowner's duty to non-trespassers or imposed a
standard of reasonable care as to all entrants. Although these
courts may have reached different results in their balancing of
interests, what is most important is that they have treated the
law as a living organism and have not allowed the dead hand
of the past to perpetuate remediable errors.
David A. Koenig
284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
"7 Id. at 696.

